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Post-Verdict Motions Under Rule 50:
Protecting the Verdict-Winner
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
process by which parties may move for post-verdict judgments
in the district courts.' Thereunder, a party is permitted to
1. FED. R. Crv. P. 50 reads as follows:
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict: When Made; Effect. A
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evi-
ence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event
that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the
right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties
to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for
a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is
effective without any assent of the jury. As amended Jan. 21,
1963, eff. July 1, 1963.(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of
all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the
court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury sub-ject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party
who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to havejudgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within 10
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judg-
ment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A
motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a
new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was
returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.
If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry ofjudgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may
order a new trial. As amended Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.(c) Same: Conditional Rulings on Grant of Motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, provided for in subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the
court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial if any, by
determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds
for granting or denying the motion for the new trial. If the mo-
tion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order
thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and thejudgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed
unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the appel-
lee on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judg-
ment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be m
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion
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move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered
by an opponent without waiving either his right to a jury trial
or his right to introduce evidence should the motion be denied.
2
If the motion for directed verdict is denied, the case is deemed
submitted to the jury subject to a latter determination of the
legal sufficiency of the motion, provided that the losing party
file his motion for judgment n.o.v. within ten days after entry
of judgment.3
Rule 50 further provides that the motion for judgment n.o.v.
may be joined with a motion for a new trial.4 If this is done,
the trial judge is faced with three alternatives: he may allow
the judgment to stand; reopen the judgment and order a new
trial; or reopen the judgment and direct the entry of judgment
as if the previously requested directed verdict had been granted.
If the judgment n.o.v. is granted, the trial judge must also make
a conditional ruling on the new trial motion.5 By this procedure
a court of appeals will be afforded the benefit of knowing how
the trial judge would dispose of the case in the event that his
ruling on the judgment n.o.v. is reversed on appeal. If the
motion for judgment n.o.v. is denied by the trial court, the
party who prevailed on the motion may, as appellee, assert
grounds entitling him to a new trial should the appellate court
reverse the trial court's ruling on the judgment n.o.v. 6
A reading of the relevant earlier cases which aided in the
formation and subsequent interpretation of the provisions of
Rule 50 seems to indicate a tendency to preserve the opportunity
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Added
Jan. 21 1963, eff. July 1 1963.(d5 Same: Denial of Motion. If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed
on that motion may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling him
to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that
the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses thejudgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining
that the appellee is entitled to a new trial, or from directing
the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be
granted. Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.
2. Id. at (a).
3. Technically, the post-verdict motion with which this Note is
concerned is a "judgment notwithstanding." However, since many writ-
ers refer to the motion as one for judgment n.o.v., the Note will employ
this latter form of terminology for convenience. See generally J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE f 50 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as MooER].
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (b).
5. Id. at (c)(1).
6. Id. at (d).
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of the verdict-winner 7 to invoke the discretion of the trial judge
for an initial ruling on his new trial motion, in the event that
the verdict is reversed on appeal.8 In two recent decisions,
however, the position of the Supreme Court has become unclear.
According to the decision in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction
Company,9 the verdict-winner, if he is reversed on appeal and if
his situation is an "appropriate one," must urge the appellate
court to grant him a new trial or he will lose this chance. Under
the terms of Iacurci v. Lummus Company,'0 however, the verdict-
winner is free to move for a new trial in the lower court even
after losing his verdict on appeal, regardless of whether he
requested a new trial at the appellate level.
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the relevant
decisions in the area and to suggest a workable procedural for-
mat which both appellate courts and counsel could utilize in the
event that the verdict-winner is reversed on appeal. Included is
a discussion of the appropriate forum for initially disposing of
new trial motions, as well as possible alternatives within the
existing framework of the Rules.
II. THE RELEVANT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Since the Federal Rules replaced the use of local civil pro-
cedure in the federal district courts" with a uniform procedure,
the Supreme Court has been the primary interpretive force.
Therefore, an analysis of the decisions which have considered
Rule 50 is basic to any attempt aimed at achieving a workable
procedure within the framework and spirit of the Rule.
The genesis of case law under the Rule was in Montgomery
Ward & Company v. Duncan'2 where the verdict-loser moved
for judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict,
or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial judge granted
7. For the purposes of the Note, the term "verdict-winner" will
be used to designate the party who has received a favorable determina-
tion in the lower court.
8. See Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952);
Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949); Fountain
v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S.
571 (1948); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940). These cases
will be discussed in a subsequent section of the Note.
9. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
10. 387 U.S. 86 (1967).
11. Conformity Act (Act of June 1, 1872, ch. CCLV, § 5; 17 STAT.
197).
12. 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
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the judgment n.o.v. but declined to rule on the new trial mo-
tion. 13  On appeal,' 4 the verdict-loser's judgment n.o.v. was re-
versed and the court of appeals rejected the argument that the
cause be remanded for disposition of the new trial motion in the
district court, ordering entry of judgment for the verdict-winner.
Procedurally, the case can be represented as follows:
Montgomery Ward & Company v. Duncan,
311 U.S. 243 (1940)
Trial Court Court of Appeals
P D P D
N/T .-
J.
N.O.V. -+ -0
Key:
+ - granted or affirmed
O - denied or reversed
- - not ruled upon
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held
that the case should have been remanded to the trial judge for
a ruling on the new trial motion. In order to prevent the
problem in other cases the Court's mandate, now embodied in
Rules 50(c) and (d), required that in the future the trial judge
initially rule on the motion for judgment n.o.v. and conditionally
decide the new trial question in case the judgment n.o.v. should
be reversed on appeal.15
13. The trial judge evidently felt that a disposition of the new
trial motion was no longer necessary in view of the granting of thejudgment n.o.v. motion. See 5 MooRE % 50.13, at 2376.
14. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 108 F.2d 848, 853 (1940).
15. Rules 50(c) and (d) which were formally adopted in 1963,
have placed the trial judge in an unenviable position: in essence, he
must pass on the motion for new trial irrespective of the fact that he
has granted a judgment n.o.v. It is virtually impossible for the trial
judge to rule properly on the new trial motion without the knowledge
of how the appellate court will rule on his treatment of the judgment
n.o.v. motion. As Professor Moore notes in his treatise:
He [the trial judge] must assume, for purposes of the judgment
n.o.v., that the law, as read by the appellate court will support
the judgment. On the motion for a new trial, he must assume
that the appellate court's decision will not support the judgment
19681
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In Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Company," the
issue presented was whether an appellate court could enter a
judgment n.o.v. for a party who had not filed this particular
motion in the trial court. Following a denial of his motion in
the trial court for a directed verdict, and the return of a jury
verdict for plantiff, defendant moved for a new trial rather
than moving under Rule 50(b) to have the verdict set aside
and judgment entered in his favor. On appeal, it was held
that the admission of certain evidence offered by plaintiff was
prejudicial error and that without this evidence plaintiff's proof
was insufficient to go to the jury. Consequently, the judgment
was reversed with directions that judgment be entered for the
defendant-appellant. The procedural history of the Cone case
is as follows:
n.o.v., but he obviously cannot know for what reasons the ap-
pellate court will not support the judgment. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the Rule, as presently framed and interpreted, gives
the trial court no freedom to abstain from passing on the mo-
tion for a new trial ....
5 MooRE 50.13 at 2379. See also Momand v. Universal Film Exch.,
72 F. Supp. 469, affd 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 647 (1949). Professor Moore lists the following as the procedural
effects of the Montgomery Ward rationale:
1. The trial court is required to make a ruling on the motion
for a new trial even where it grants a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
2. If judgment n.o.v. is reversed and the motion for new trial
conditionally granted, the new trial shall proceed unless the
appellate court orders the contrary. The appellate court,
however, may also reverse the conditional grant of a new
trial.
3. If the conditional motion for a new trial has been denied,
the party securing the motion for judgment n.o.v. may urge
the reversal of this decision on the appeal without filing a
cross-appeal.
4. Where motion for judgment n.o.v. has been granted, the
opposing party may seek a new trial. But it is contemplated
that he may urge the appellate court to order a new trial on
his appeal from the entry of judgment n.o.v. even without
making a motion for new trial in the trial court.
5. Where judgment has been entered on the verdict after denial
of the motion for judgment n.o.v. and the conditional motion
for a new trial, the prevailing party may urge that the appel-
late court, in the event that it reverses the trial court ruling
on judgment n.o.v., itself order a new trial. The appellate
court presumably has that power without being urged to do
so by the appellee.
J. MOORE, MANUAL ON FEDERAL PRAcTMCE & PROCEDURE 22.11 at 1644
(1962) The following cases support the procedural variations offered
by Professor Moore: Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337
U.S. 801 (1948); Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249
F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1957); Patterson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 238 F.2d 645
(6th Cir. 1956); Bailey v. Slentz, 189 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1951).
16. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
[Vol. 53:358
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Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Company,
330 U.S. 212 (1947)
Key:
+ - Granted or affirmed
O - Denied
- - Not ruled upon
The Supreme Court in Cone held that the appellate court
lacked the power to direct entry of judgment where the appellant
had failed to move for judgment n.o.v. under Rule 50(b). 17
The majority concluded that the appellee should not have his
right to a new trial foreclosed without having had the benefit
of the judgment of the trial judge on new trial issues. s Thus,
the Court interpreted the Rule as permitting the trial judge to
exercise the initial discretion of choosing between the alterna-
tives open to him under the Rule.1 9
17. By its decision, the Court overturned the practically unanimous
construction of Rule 50(b) by the various federal appellate courts.
See Lowden v. Bell, 138 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1943); Howard Univ. v.
Cassell, 126 F.2d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (142);
United States v. Halliday, 116 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 315 U.S. 94 (1942); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.
1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941). The Court, in effect,
also rejected the position of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure. See PRoPosED Am NNTS TO RuLEs op CIV. Paoc. 63-5
(1946).
18. 330 U.S. 212, 217. The decision, it should be noted, created a
basic inconsistency; even if the trial judge denies motions for both judg-
ment n.o.v. and new trial, the appellate court is free to review and pos-
sibly reverse the denials. In essence, therefore, the appellate court can
override the "discretion" of the trial judge. The Supreme Court, never-
theless chose not to curtail this initial power of the trial court, evi-
dently basing their conclusion on the assumption that it would be
prejudicial to the verdict-winner not to be permitted to move for a new
trial or a voluntary dismissal with the trial judge after he has lost his
verdict on appeal. See Comment, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1077 (1947).
19. 330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947). For the choices open to a judge
196B]
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After the decision in Cone, some appellate courts chose to
limit the case to a situation where a court of appeals attempted
to grant a verdict-loser's motion for directed verdict where no
motion for judgment n.o.v. had been made.20 Globe Liquor
Company v. San Roman,21 however, repudiated this interpreta-
tion of the Cone decision. The Court there held that the fact
that a jury returned its verdict under the specific directions of
the trial judge did not distinguish the case from Cone.22 The
action in Globe involved an alleged breach of warranty in the
sale of liquor. The trial judge granted the plaintiff's motion
-for a directed verdict and entered judgment. The defendant
had moved for a directed verdict which was denied; he had
not moved for a judgment n.o.v. and his motion for a new trial
was denied. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and the cause was remanded with instructions to grant
the defendant's motion for directed verdict.23 The decision of
the appellate court, in effect, entered a judgment n.o.v. for the
defendant. Procedurally, the Globe case appears as follows:
Globe Liquor Company v. San Roman,
332 U.S. 571 (1947)
Trial Court Court of Appeals
P D P D
D/V + 0 +
J.
N.O.V. -0
N/T -
Key:
+ - Granted
0 - Denied
- - Not ruled upon or
Not moved for
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate
when ruling upon a motion for judgment n.o.v. and in the alternative, a
motion for new trial, see note 15 supra.
20. See 5 MooRE f 50.12, at 2368.
21. 332 U.S. 571 (1948).
22. Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 573 (1948).
23. Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 160 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1947).
[Vol. 53:358
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court insofar as it had directed the trial court to sustain the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The Court held that
the court of appeals lacked the power to enter judgment on
defendant's motion for directed verdict since a motion for judg-
ment n.o.v. had not been made at the trial court level, the
procedure dictated by Rule 50 (b).24 As in the Cone decision, the
24. In Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94 (1942), rev'g 116 F.2d
812 (4th Cir. 1941), and Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.
1940), rev'd on facts, 312 U.S. 492 (1941), it was argued that if a judge
made an express reservation of decision when he denied a motion for
directed verdict, it would be sufficient to give the appellate court power
to enter judgment n.o.v. even though the party had failed to move for
it in the trial court. Under this analysis, the language which outlined
post-verdict motions was designed merely to permit the losing party
to obtain a reconsideration of his previous motion at the trial level.
Therefore the judgment n.o.v. motion was not a necessary prerequisite
to the granting of such a motion by the appellate court.
The advisory committee in 1946 proposed to amend Rule 50(b) so
as to codify this procedure. Rule 50 (b) was to have read as follows:
(b) [Reservation Of Decision On Motion] Motion For Judg-
ment. [Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the
close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not
granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action
to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal ques-
tions raised by the motion.] Within 10 days after the reception
of a verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict at
the close of all the evidence may move to [have] set aside the
verdict and any judgment entered thereon [set aside] and [to
have] for judgment [entered] in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict; [or if a verdict was not returned, such
party, within 10 days after the jury has been discharged, may
move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a
verdict was returned the] The court may allow the verdict orjudgment to stand or may [reopen the judgment] set it aside
and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment[as if the requested verdict had been directed] for the moving
party. The making of a motion for judgment in conformity
with the motion for a directed verdict shall not be necessaryfor the purpose of raising on review the question whether the
verdict should have been directed or whether judgment in con-formity with the motion for a directed verdict should be en-
tered. If no verdict [was] is returned, the court on motion
made within 10 days after the jury has been discharged may
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had
been directed or may order a new trial.
A motion for a new trial, as an alternative, may be joined
with a motion for judgment. If the motion for judgment is
granted, the court in its discretion may either refrain from
ruling upon the motion for new trial or rule upon it by deter-
mining whether it should be granted if the judgment is there-
after vacated or reversed. The making of a conditional order on
the motion for a new trial or the refraining from making
such an order, does not affect the finality of the judgment. In
case the alternative motion for a new trial has been condition-
ally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new
trial shall proceed unless the appellate court shall have other-
wise ordered. In case the alternative motion for a new trial
1968]
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Court's dicta again indicated that the question of whether a new
trial should be granted to the plaintiff, now the losing party in
the action, should be passed upon in the first instance by the
trial court.
25
The Globe and Cone decisions were criticized as being over-
technical, and this criticism was further heightened in Johnson
v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.2 6  Here the
defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence. The trial court specifically reserved a decision on the
motion. The jury subsequently returned a verdict for plain-
tiff. In a post-verdict motion, defendant asked the court to
set aside the verdict on the ground that it was "excessive, con-
trary to the law, to the evidence, and to the weight of the
evidence. ' 27 The trial judge denied both the directed verdict
motion he had previously reserved judgment upon, and the
post-verdict motion. On appeal, the court of appeals held that
a directed verdict should have been granted for the defendant,
and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the de-
fendant. Procedurally, the Johnson case appears as follows:
has been conditionally denied and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the
order of the appellate court. In case the district court has
refrained from ruling upon the motion for a new trial when
granting the motion for judgment and the judgment is re-
versed on appeal, the district court shall then dispose of the mo-
tion for a new trial unless the appellate court shall have other-
wise ordered.
See 5 MOORE f 50.01 [8], 2307 (old material is bracketed; proposed
amendments are italicized). REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES
OF CIVL PROCEDURE FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE U.S. 62-63 (1946). This
amendment was refused. 329 U.S. 843 (1946).
25. Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 322 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1948).
26. 344 U.S. 48 (1952). Professor Moore calls this decision the "na-
dir of technicality." 5 MooRE ff 50.12, at 2370.
27. 344 U.S. at 49. The action was brought under the Jones Act for
wrongful death. The defendant railroad had maintained that the em-
ployee's death could in no way be attributed to the railroad.
[Vol. 53:358
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Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,
344 U.S. 48 (1952)
Trial Court Court of Appeals
P D P D
D/V - 0 - +
Motion to set aside
verdict as excessive
and contrary to law - 0 -
and evidence.
J.... +N.O.V.
Key:
+ - Granted
- - Not ruled upon
O - Denied or reversed
The verdict-loser in Johnson, unlike his counterparts in
Cone and Globe, had made a post-verdict motion. But instead of
moving for a judgment n.o.v., he moved to set aside the verdict
as excessive and contrary to law and the evidence. Even if the
majority reading of the motion is accepted, it had the effect of a
motion for new trial only. The case then became procedurally
identical to the Cone case. The Court held that the appellate
court lacked the power to reverse and enter a judgment n.o.v.
where the appellant, the verdict-loser in the trial court, failed to
move specifically for a judgment n.o.v. In effect the Johnson
decision required a party to employ a certain label and form
when making post-verdict motions.28
The opinions of the Court which interpreted Rule 50 were
criticized as being unnecessary sacrifices to procedural formality.
In fact, however, all of the decisions are concerned with preserv-
ing the opportunity to the jury verdict-winner to have a new
trial in the trial court if his verdict is reversed on appeal. The
strict procedural guidelines can be argued to have been necessary
28. As Justice Frankfurter noted in dissent:
Our decisions do not suggest ... that the party in whose favor
a court of appeals directs a judgment n.o.v. is required to use a
ritualistic formula.
Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 57 (1952).
1968]
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to insulate the verdict-winner from the handicaps which could
result from an adverse termination of litigation at the appellate
level.
A verdict-winner may have preserved objections to a
number of potential errors committed during the trial. He may
have made mistakes himself in his arguments on admission or
exclusion of evidence, or have cast the facts in terms of one of
several alternative legal theories for recovery and the choice
may have been ill-advised.2 It is also possible that the testi-
mony of a crucial witness could not be obtained due to lack of
jurisdiction to compel an appearance. So long as the verdict-
winner has his verdict, however, he will resist any motion for
judgment n.o.v. or new trial by his adversary. He will want to
retain his verdict, not lose it or risk it at another trial. Even if
error has been committed in the trial court to his disadvantage,
he is not interested in asserting that error so long as his verdict
stands. If the trial court grants his adversary's motion for
judgment n.o.v., the verdict-winner may within ten days move
for a new trial under Rule 50 (c) (2).30 This procedure is de-
sirable since it affords the verdict-winner the opportunity to
invoke the discretion of the trial judge-the judge who saw and
heard the case. It should be noted that there is no authori-
zation under Rule 50(c) (2) for a verdict-winner to make a con-
ditional motion for new trial. If the verdict-loser secured a
reversal in the appellate court, the verdict-winner might have
been foreclosed from presenting a motion for new trial to the
trial court had the earlier decisions not insured this opportunity.
With the procedural history of the major opinions inter-
preting Rule 50 in mind, the cases can be considered in the con-
text of the Court's apparent desire to preserve the chance of the
verdict-winner initially to invoke the discretion of the trial judge
on his new trial motion. It will be suggested that when con-
sidered in this light, the apparently "overtechnical" opinions
take on a new cast.
Montgomery Ward & Company v. Duncan,31 as noted previ-
ously, held that a trial judge must rule on both the judgment
n.o.v. motion and the new trial motion. The decision necessarily
preserved the right of the litigant to have the trial judge initially
rule on the new trial question. The Court indicated that if a
29. See Petitioner's Brief at 131, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
30. See note 1 supra.
31. 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
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trial court erred in granting a judgment n.o.v. motion, the
party against whom the verdict went was entitled to have his
motion for new trial considered with respect to asserted sub-
stantial trial errors and matters which appeal to the discretion
of the trial judge.32 The decision, therefore, indicated that a
verdict-winner, reversed on appeal, should be afforded the op-
portunity of moving for a new trial in the trial court as the
trial judge, having heard and seen the case, was in the best
position to rule upon the new trial motion. It is true that there
is no language in the Montgomery Ward decision that is incon-
sistent with the Neely decision in that aspect of Neely which
permits appellate courts initially to rule on new trial motions.
However, the Montgomery Ward decision seems to assume that
the trial court will be the first court to rule on such motions.
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Company,33 held that
an appellate court lacked the power under Rule 50 (b) to reverse
and dismiss under circumstances where the verdict-loser had
failed to move for judgment n.o.v. in the trial court. The Cone
opinion noted that if an appellate court could enter judgment for
a verdict-loser who had not moved for a judgment n.o.v. below,
the verdict-winner would be foreclosed from obtaining a new
trial in the lower court in order that he might repair any error
which might have existed in his case.34 This situation could arise
where an appellate court finds that the instructions did not sub-
mit a portion of the evidence to the jury,35 and that evidence may
therefore not be considered in testing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.36 By removing, in effect, some of the verdict-winner's evi-
dence, the court of appeals then reverses on the ground of in-
sufficiency of evidence. The trial judge, who saw and heard the
case, could conceivably grant the verdict-winner's motion for a
new trial, since the case in fact had sufficient evidence to warrant
a favorable determination for the verdict-winner. If the court of
appeals, however, is permitted to order entry of judgment, and
thus foreclose the right of the verdict-winner to seek a new
trial from the trial judge, the result could be highly unjust. The
majority in Cone, therefore, stated that the determination of
32. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1940).
33. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
34. Id. at 217.
35. The author acknowledges that there is a split of authority over
the question of whether a litigant who has not introduced evidence on
one theory of liability has "waived" this right. An example of a decision
where the principle of waivers was employed can be found in O'Hare
v. Menck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967).
36. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered
under Rule 50(b) called for the initial judgment of the judge
who saw and heard the witnesses and who had a feel for the
case which no printed appellate transcript could impart.37
In the Globe38 decision the Court was presented with a
situation where each of the parties had moved for directed
verdicts and the trial court had granted plaintiffs. Some critics
argued that the post-verdict motion for a judgment n.o.v., which
defendant had not in fact made, was implicit in the earlier
motion for a directed verdict.39 Others, such as Professor Moore,
have contended that the Court's preference for the trial judge
initially to rule on new trial motions was met in Globe, since
the denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict implied
that the trial judge did not feel that a new trial was necessary.40
It is submitted that the criticism leveled against the Globe
result is unwarranted. Many have failed to appreciate the
apparent concern of the Court for the protection of the verdict-
winner and not the verdict-loser.4 - If the verdict-loser, as in
Globe, does not move for a post-verdict judgment n.o.v. and the
appellate court reverses and orders entry of judgment for the
verdict-loser, the verdict-winner is not afforded an opportunity
to remedy any defect which the appellate court might discover
in his case. If the verdict-loser had moved in the trial court for
a judgment n.o.v., then the opportunity is afforded the verdict-
winner in the trial court. This was the rationale adopted by the
Court in the 1949 decision of Fountain v. Filson.42  Here the
trial court granted defendant's motion for a summary judgment
under Rule 56 on the sole basis that New Jersey law would not
permit the imposition of a resulting trust under the circum-
stances disclosed in plaintiff's complaint. The appellate court,
after examining depositions, found the existence of a personal
obligation owed by the defendant verdict-winner to the plain-
tiff. The action was remanded with instructions to order entry
of judgment for plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court, holding that the defendant had had no occasion
in the trial court to dispute the facts material to the claim that a
37. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
38. 332 U.S. 571 (1948).
39. Cf. Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94 (1942); Berry v.
United States, 312 U.S. 450 (1941); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d
Cir. 1940).
40. 5 MooPn 50.12, at 2369.
41. See Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949).
42. 336 U.S. 681 (1949).
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personal obligation existed.43  In effect, therefore, the Filson
case, like the decision in Globe, held that a judgment n.o.v.
could not be granted in the appellate court in favor of a party
who had lost in the trial court and who had not there moved for
such relief since it would unduly handicap the verdict-winner.
The criticism of the Globe opinion, that the denial of the
defendant's motion for directed verdict had the effect of initially
invoking the discretion of the trial judge on the new trial issues,
also seems unsound. There are a multitude of reasons why a
trial judge may deny a motion for directed verdict. He might
want the case to go to the jury, or he may feel that the moving
party is certain to win and that the granting of the directed
verdict motion is therefore unnecessary. In any event, when a
judge is faced with a motion for a directed verdict, his concern
is over sufficiency of evidence, and not new trial issues. The
denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict in Globe,
therefore, cannot be viewed as a disposition of new trial issues.
The past decisions of the Supreme Court arguably demon-
strate that there are practical and cogent reasons for requiring
strict adherence to the procedure specified in Rule 50. If the
verdict-loser secures the equivalent of a judgment n.o.v. on
appeal, and if he had not sought such a judgment in the trial
court, the verdict-winner could be handicapped. First, his op-
portunity to invoke the discretion of the trial court for initial
determination of new trial questions is foreclosed when the
appellate court orders entry of judgment for the appellant ver-
dict-loser.44 Consequently, he is deprived of having the person
best able to determine whether a new trial is necessary rule on
his motion. Second, if an appellate court enters judgment for a
verdict-loser, the verdict-winner is denied the opportunity to
repair any error which might have existed in his case.45 Third,
if an appellate court orders entry of judgment where a verdict-
winner's theory of liability is untenable, but where his evidence
might be adequate on a different theory, he is denied the second
chance to pursue this alternate theory in the trial court, since
he cannot move there for a new trial.46
43. Id. at 683.
44. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
45. Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949);
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp &
Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
46. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958);
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Weade v. Dichmann, Wright &
Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949). This argument assumes that the "waiv-
er" principle will not be employed. See note 35 supra.
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III. TWO RECENT DECISIONS
Two recent Supreme Court opinions raise questions about
the continued preference 47 for preserving the opportunity of the
verdict-winner to move for a new trial in the trial court. The
first of these decisions was Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction
Company.48 The petitioner in Neely had brought a diversity ac-
tion in the district court for damages suffered due to the death of
her father. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for di-
rected verdict and sent the case to the jury.49 A verdict was
returned for the plaintiff, and the defendant's subsequent mo-
tion for judgment n.o.v. was denied. Also denied was defendant's
alternative motion for a new trial. Plaintiff did not move con-
ditionally for a new trial. The appellate court found that the
evidence was insufficient to establish either proximate cause or
negligence and it reversed with instructions to dismiss the action.
Procedurally, therefore, the Neely case appears as follows:
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Company,
386 U.S. 317 (1967)
Trial Court Court of Appeals
P D P D
D/V - 0 - -
J.
N.O.V. - 0 - +
NIT X - x -
Key:
+ - Granted
O - Denied or Reversed
- - Not ruled upon or
Not moved for
X - No Motion
47. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958);
Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949); Fountain
v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332
U.S. 571 (1948); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212
(1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
48. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
49. In the Neely case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
negligent construction, maintenance, and supervision of a scaffold used
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The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and ruled
that "in appropriate cases" an appellate court, after reversing
the denial of the verdict-loser's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment
n.o.v., could itself order dismissal or direct the entry of judgment
for the verdict-loser.50 In effect, the decision in Neely permits
the appellate court, in appropriate cases, to rule upon the new
trial question in the first instance.
Citing Cone,51 the Neely Court stated that earlier decisions
required that a court of appeals not grant a judgment n.o.v.
The Court recognized that a court of appeals should not order
entry of judgment under circumstances where the trial judge,
due to his first-hand knowledge of the case, was in the best
position to rule initially on the new trial question.52 But the
majority concluded that the above-mentioned consideration did
not justify an ironclad rule whereby an appellate court could
never order dismissal of a judgment.53 The Court noted that
the verdict-winner had three opportunities to raise a new trial
motion: in the trial court after his adversary moved for a
a judgment n.o.v.; in the appellate court where he defended his
verdict; or in a petition for rehearing if the trial court was
reversed.64
The Court in Neely seemed to depart from its earlier posi-
tion. In an expansive reading of Rule 50, the Court for the first
time held that consideration of the new trial question in the
first instance could be found in the court of appeals. 55
In Iacurci v. Lummus Company,5 decided shortly after
Neely, the defendant verdict-loser appealed after the trial court
denied his motion for judgment n.o.v.5 7 The appellate court,
in the construction of a missile silo had proximately caused her father's
fatal plunge from the platform. The trial judge, after denying the de-
fendant's motion for directed verdict, submitted the case to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $25,000. The Supreme
Court held that the record was insufficient to present new trial issues,
and that since the appellee raised no such issues in her brief, the court
of appeals could properly enter judgment for the verdict-loser. Neely v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 330 (1967).
50. Id. at 326-27.
51. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
52. 386 U.S. at 325.
53. Id. at 326.
54. Id. at 328-29. The case also cites illustrative federal court rules
of order under which each of these procedures could be taken.
55. Id. at 326-27.
56. 387 U.S. 86 (1967).
57. In the Iacurci action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
negligent design of a "skip hoist" proximately caused the death of her
husband who was testing the device. The trial judge submitted the
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as in Neely, reversed and ordered the entry of judgment for the
verdict-loser. In this case, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals, holding that under the circum-
stances of this case the trial judge was in the best position to
rule on the issue of a new trial ". . . in the light of the evidence,
his charge to the jury, and the jury's verdict and interrogatory
answers."
58
The similarity in both the procedural and substantive as-
pects of the Neely and Iacurci actions has blurred the circum-
stances under which the verdict-winner must move for a new
trial in the appellate court or lose this right. In both actions
the defendant moved for a directed verdict and the motion was
denied. In both actions the trial judge denied the defendant
verdict-loser's motions for judgment n.o.v. In both actions the
appellate court reversed on the ground of insufficiency of evi-
dence to support a verdict for plaintiff. In spite of the striking
similarities between the two actions the Court concluded one
was an appropriate case for the appellate court to order entry
of judgment and the other was not.
As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Iacurci,9 the
Court has evidently decided to interpose in each case its own
judgment of the competence of the appellate court and the
trial court to pass on the new trial motion. This ad hoc ap-
proach to the problem has placed the verdict-winner in the
unenviable predicament of having no certainty in knowing when
he must seek a new trial grant in the appellate court or lose
this right.
IV. TRIAL COURT vs. APPELLATE COURT:
WHICH IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR INITIALLY
DISPOSING OF NEW TRIAL MOTIONS?
The order granting certiorari in Neely6 ° directed the parties
to consider whether Rule 50(d) and the past decisions of the
question of negligence to the jury by a special interrogatory which asked
that, if they found negligent design of the skip hoist, they indicate
which of five specific design aspects it had found unsafe. The jury re-
turned a special verdict for petitioner but answered only one of the five
subsections. The Court reversed the appellate court which had ordered
entry of judgment for the verdict-loser, since it did not share the court of
appeal's confidence as to the meaning cf the jury's failure to answer
other subdivisions of the interrogatory. Thus, in Iacurci the record
indicated that the trial judge should rule on the new trial question.
lacurci v. Lummus Co., 387 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1967).
58. Id. at 88.
59. Id. at 88-89.
60. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
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Court 1 permitted an appellate court to order dismissal of an
action despite the provision of 50(c) giving the verdict-winner
the right to move for a new trial where the trial court sets his
verdict aside. In replying to this question the respondent argued
that the basic authority for the appellate court to consider
new trial motions was contained in section 2106 of the Judicial
Code of 1948 which provides that an appellate court may direct
the entry of ". . . such appropriate judgment ... as may be
just under the circumstances. '6 2
Having thus established, as a legislative matter, the power
of the appellate court, respondent argued that the earlier de-
cisions of the Court did not bar its exercise. It read the Cone 3
and Globe 4 decisions as holding only that the appellate court
did not have the power to order entry of judgment 65 where the
verdict-loser had not moved for judgment n.o.v. in the trial
court.66 In the same way it confined Weade v. Dichmann,
Wright & Pugh Incorporated7 to holding that the appellate
court could reverse for insufficiency of evidence, 68 dismissal at
the appellate level being inappropriate only where alternative
theories of negligence appeared on the face of the record.
The argument that section 210669 of the Judicial Code of 1948
conferred an authority upon the appellate court to order entry
of judgment was first raised in the dissent of Johnson v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.70 As Justice Black
noted in his dissent in Neely,71 section 2106 is concerned with
61. Those listed in the Court's order were: Weade v. Dichmann,
Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949); Globe Liquor Co. v. San
Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.,
330 U.S. 212 (1947).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1966).
63. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1946).
64. Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948). For a
discussion of this case see note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See Brief for Respondent at 19-20, Neely v. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
66. Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949).
The Weade decision involved the difficult area of actions reversed by an
appellate court due to a finding of insufficient evidence. This line of
cases was represented by Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949), in the
discussion of the earlier Supreme Court decisions in section II of this
Note.
67. Brief for Respondent at 23, Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
386 U.S. 317 (1967).
68. This section is derived directly from § 24 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 24; 1 Stat. 85).
69. Jensen v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 65 (1952).
70. 344 U.S. 48, 54 (1952).
71. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 339 (1967).
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only the general power granted by the Congress to the appellate
courts. Justice Black states:
It begs the question to argue that it is appropriate for an appel-
late court in such circumstances to order a dismissal merely
because § 2106 provides that a court of appeals may direct the
entry of an "appropriate judgment." 72
Moreover, dicta in the earlier decisions of the Court, as
noted earlier, manifest definite concern for the protection of the
verdict-winner who has suffered a reversal on appeal. The
Cone73 decision specifically stated that the determination of the
new trial question called for a judgment in the first instance by
the trial judge.74 More important, however, was Justice Black's
statement in Neely that the result in Cone would have been
the same had the verdict-loser unsuccessfully moved for a judg-
ment n.o.v. in the trial court.75 In the Globe76 decision the
court extending the rationale in Cone, stated that the power to
determine the new trial issue should initially be vested in the
trial judge who saw and heard the case.77 In the Weade78
decision, the Court modified the decision of the appellate court
which had ordered entry of judgment for the verdict-winner,
so as to provide the verdict-winner with the opportunity to
present his new trial motion to the trial judge.70 Thus, the
earlier cases have consistently indicated a preference for pre-
serving the right of a verdict-winner who is reversed on appeal
to invoke the discretion of the trial judge initially on the new
trial question.8 0 There is a basic inconsistency in favoring the
right of a verdict-winner to move for a new trial in the trial
court after losing his verdict on appeal, and allowing an appel-
late court to reverse and enter judgment against the verdict-
winner. The latter ability necessarily precludes the operation
of the former one. The earlier decisions of the Court would not
have allowed an appellate court to reverse and order entry of
judgment for the verdict-loser, even if there had been a post-
verdict motion for judgment n.o.v. in the trial court.
72. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
73. Id. at 217.
74. See Justice Black's dissent in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co., 386 U.S. 317, 336 (1967).
75. Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948).
76. Id. at 572.
77. Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949).
78. Id. at 809.
79. Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952); Weade
v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949); Fountain v.
Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S.
571 (1948); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
80. See note 1 supra.
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Rule 50(d), in addition to the Judicial Code of 1948 and the
earlier decisions of the Court, does not lend itself readily to the
interpretation that it grants to the appellate court the right to
order entry of judgment and therefore foreclose the opportunity
of the verdict-winner to move for a new trial in the trial court.
Rule 50(d) outlines the procedure to be utilized when a motion
for judgment n.o.v. has been denied by the trial court.81 The
rule permits the verdict-winner to urge the court of appeals to
grant a new trial in the event his verdict is reversed on appeal.
The majority in Neely concluded that Rule 50(d) was not simply
permissive. Instead, the Rule empowered the appellate court to
grant a new trial itself, to remand for a determination of the new
trial issue in the lower court, or to order entry of judgment.8 s2
Rule 50(d) does not, however, state that the verdict-winner
can lose his right to invoke the discretion of the trial judge if
his verdict is lost on appeal. The Rule provides that the verdict-
winner may assert grounds for a new trial if the appellate court
reverses his verdict.8 3 The Rule also permits the court of appeals
to grant a new trial or to remand with directions to determine
whether a new trial is in order.8 4 The majority in Neely inter-
preted this language as a grant of power to the appellate court
to enter judgment in appropriate cases.8 5 As Justice Black
noted in his Neely dissent:
The Court entirely overlooks the fact that the Rule is likewise
permissive in the nature of its direction to the verdict-winner
as appellee: it provides that the verdict-winner "may" ask the
Court of Appeals for a new trial; it does not provide that he
must do so in order to protect his right to a new trial.8 6
The purpose of Rule 50(d) is to assist the verdict-winner in
protecting his rights. The Neely rationale, however, by permit-
ting the appellate court to enter judgment after reversing the
trial court, assists the verdict-winner in losing this right.87 The
procedure adopted in the Neely decision, recommended by the
81. In this regard the Court stated:
Rule 50 (d) . . . emphasizes that "nothing in this rule precludes"
the court of appeals "from determining that the appellee is en-
titled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to deter-
mine whether a new trial shall be granted". .. [C]onsideration
of the new trial question "in the first instance" is lodged with
the court of appeals.
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 323 (1967).
82. See note 1 supra.
83. Id.
84. See note 81 supra.
85. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 passim (1967).
86. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
87. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civ. Proc. 63-6 (1946).
For a text of the proposed rule see note 24 supra.
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Rules Committee in 1946,88 was identical to the procedure that
the Court expressly rejected in the Cone89 decision. When Rule
50 (d) was adopted in 196390 there was not the slightest indication
that it was intended to adopt the practice that the Court had
found so objectionable in Cone.91
Even if it is assumed that the decision in the Neely case is
correct, as a matter of interpreting the language of Rule 50(d),
it is undesirable to have an appellate court rule upon most new
trial questions in the first instance. Since the Rule clearly
permits the appellate court to remand for determination of the
new trial issue at the trial court level, it is urged that this be
the policy that the appellate courts adopt.
Under Rule 50 the trial court possesses the power to dispose
of new trial motions properly before it. 92 Ordinarily, the ap-
pellate court will not review the action of a trial court in
granting or denying a motion for a new trial. Only in the rare
instance where the court of appeals finds a so-called abuse of
discretion by the trial court will it reverse the lower court's
ruling.93 Thus, as was stated in Montgomery Ward & Company
v. Duncan,94 if the trial judge gramts a judgment n.o.v. and
conditionally orders a new trial, his disposition of the new trial
motion will ordinarily not be reviewable.9 5 If the judgment is
subsequently reversed on appeal, the case would then usually
be governed by the lower court's award of a new trial.
The rationale behind the usual policy of not reviewing a
trial court's disposition of a new trial motion is clear. First, it
88. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216
(1946). In Cone the Court, swayed by their preference to protect the
verdict-winner on appeal, rejected the procedure which at the time most
of the appellate courts were following. See United States v. Halliday,
315 U.S. 94 (1942), rev'g 116 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1941) and Conway v.
O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
89. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212
(1946).
90. Rule 50(d) was added January 21, 1963, effective July 1, 1963.
91. See Justice Black's dissent in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co., 386 U.S. 317, 341 (1967).
92. See note 1 supra.
93. See Gelco Bldrs. v. United States, 369 F.2d 992 (1966); Sokol v.
Gussack, 367 F.2d 576 (1966); Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. Clayton, 366 F.2d
551 (10th Cir. 1966); Dupont v. Southern Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193 (1966);
Diapulse Corp. of America v. Bertcher Corp., 362 F.2d 736 (1966);
McMullin v. Palmer, 40 F.R.D. 368 (1966).
94. 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
95. See Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 175 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1949).
See also Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1961-1963 (II), 77 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1964).
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is generally assumed that since the trial judge actually heard
the case, he is in a position superior to the appellate court with
respect to disposing of new trial motions initially. This same
reason justifies a policy under which a verdict-winner, who pre-
vailed on the motion for judgment n.o.v. at the trial level, should
be allowed to move for a new trial in the trial court if he is re-
versed on appeal. The new trial issue is a factual one. As Justice
Black, dissenting in Neely stated:
Appellate tribunals are not equipped to try factual issues as trial
courts are. A trial judge who has heard the evidence in the
original case has a vast store of information and knowledge
about it that the appellate court cannot get from a cold, printed
record.96
A second reason for preferring the trial court is that the
trial judge may order a new trial at his discretion, even in the
absence of a motion by either party, while the appellate judge
must find reversible error before he can do so.7 This difference
in power permits the trial judge to prevent error-free "mis-
carriages of justice." Assume, for example, that plaintiff's coun-
sel is inexperienced and presents an extremely poor case, but
the jury returns a favorable verdict. The trial judge, feeling
that plaintiff's cause of action was sound, though poorly pre-
sented, denies the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. On
appeal, the court finds a lack of sufficient evidence and reverses
on the ground that the case should not have gone to the jury.
Since the trial was otherwise error free, the appellate court may
not order a new trial. Had the appellate court merely remanded
with instructions to the trial judge to determine whether a new
trial was proper, a different and more equitable result might
have followed.
Finally, it is desirable to have the trial judge initially pass
on the new trial question since it permits the verdict-winner to
repair any evidentiary gaps that can develop due to the reversal
of his verdict in the appellate forum. The danger of foreclosing
the right of the verdict-winner to pursue an alternative course
in proving his case is especially apparent in actions where the
appellate court has reversed a verdict-winner who had more
than one theory for defendant's alleged liability. Weade v.
Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Incorporated" is illustrative of this
problem. There the plaintiff had secured a jury verdict. On
96. 386 U.S. at 337 (1967).
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106; Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552
(1950).
98. 337 U.s. 801 (1949).
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appeal, the court held that plaintiff's theory of liability was
untenable and did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Accordingly, the jury verdict was reversed and the
appellate court ordered entry of judgment for the defendant
verdict-loser. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
appellate court, ruling that the presence of an untenable theory
of liability did not necessarily mean that the evidence was
inadequate on another theory.
If the Weade trial court had found any evidentiary flaw in
the verdict-winner's case, it might have granted the verdict-
loser's post-verdict motion for judgment n.o.v. Then the ver-
dict-winner would have had, under 'Rule 50 (c), 10 days in which
to move for a new trial. But there is no corresponding pro-
vision in the Rules for a motion in the appellate court for a new
trial within 10 days after an appellate court decision holding
that the verdict-loser's judgment n.o.v. should have been granted
in the trial court. Under these circumstances Rule 50(d) pro-
vides that the verdict-winner, the party who prevailed on the
judgment n.o.v. in the trial court, is entitled to assert in his
brief as appellee grounds for a new trial in case his judgment is
reversed.9 9 However, this provision is likely to aid the verdict-
winner only in situations where the trial court found the evi-
dentiary flaws. Then the party who prevailed on the motion
may argue in the appellate court that the exclusion of evidence
by the trial court was error and that if any evidentiary gap is
present in his case, the improperly excluded evidence would fill
the hole.10 0 But where the appellee has introduced its available
evidence, all of which the trial court had accepted, a different
circumstance arises.10 The verdict-winner, under the Neely
rationale, is expected to anticipate that the appellate court will
punch a hole in his case by intentionally ignoring substantial
portions of the evidence.
Even, therefore, if the Neely decision was correct in con-
ferring upon the appellate courts the power to dispose of new
trial questions initially, it does not follow that the appellate
courts would be wise in utilizing this power. It must be con-
ceded that at times a mandatory remand to the trial court will
result in a "useless formality.' ' 0 2 But since the Court in Neely
99. See note 1 supra.
100. Brief for Petitioner at 136, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
101. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 1961-1963, 77 HARV. L. REV. 801, 818-820 (1964).
102. See Gasman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 175 F.2d 24 (3d Cir.
1949).
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offered no guidelines as to what is an "appropriate case" to
remand, the only sensible and equitable policy under the present
rules would be to remand under all circumstances. The interest
in having the proper forum dispose of the new trial question
simply outweighs the advantages of avoiding lengthy and at
times unnecessary relitigation.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE EXISTING
FRAMEWORK OF THE RULES
A. THE UNLIMITED RIGHT TO MOVE FOR A NEw TRIAL IN THE TRIAL
COURT UNDER RuLE 50 (c) (2)
Under Rule 50(c) (2) the party whose verdict has been set
aside by a judgment n.o.v. may serve a motion for a new trial
within 10 days after entry of the judgment n.o.v. The Rules
Committee offered the following explanation for the provision:
"Subdivision (c) (2) is a reminder that a verdict-winner is en-
titled, even after entry of judgment n.o.v. against him, to move
for a new trial in the usual course."' 0 3
The Rule, on its face, does not purport to dispossess the
verdict-winner of this opportunity when the judgment n.o.v. is
granted by the appellate rather than the trial court. The deci-
sion in Neely seems to foreclose any opportunity of the verdict-
winner to invoke the discretion of the lower court on the new
trial question after the appellate court has ordered entry of
judgment against him. Since the decision in Neely permits the
appellate court to enter judgment, it is unlikely that Rule 50(c)
(2) allows the verdict-winner to urge the trial court for a new
trial within 10 days after such judgment.
Also, no part of subsection (c) comes into play unless the
trial court has granted a motion for judgment n.o.v. Therefore,
subsection (c) (2) of Rule 50 cannot be construed to allow a
party whose verdict has been set aside by direction of an appel-
late court to move for a new trial within 10 days. This con-
clusion seems inescapable in view of the Advisory Committee's
statement which accompanies the Rule. 04
103. See note 1 supra.
104. The Rules Committee comment states:
Subdivision (c) deals with the situation where a party joins a
motion for a new trial with his motion for judgment n.o.v., or
prays for a new trial in the alternative, and the motion forjudgment n.o.v. is granted. The procedure to be followed in
making rulings on the motion for the new trial, and the conse-
quences of the rulings thereon, were partly set out in Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253 (1940), and have
been further elaborated in later cases. See Cone v. West Vir-
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B. VOLUNTARY NONSUITS UNDER RuiE 41 (a)
The argument can be made that allowing a plaintiff to take
a voluntary nonsuit is a more desirable procedure to follow
under the existing Rules than an expansive reading of Rules
50(c) (1) and (c) (2). Under Rule 41(a) (2), the trial judge, even
after a verdict is returned by the jury, may grant a voluntary
nonsuit.10 5 The granting of a nonsuit is entirely within the
discretion of the trial judge. Moreover, since a voluntary non-
suit may be granted without a motion by the parties, 00 the
ginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947); Globe Liquor Co.
v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948); Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S.
681 (1949); Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48(1952). However, courts as well as counsel have often misun-
derstood the procedure, and it will be helpful to summarize the
proper practice in the text of the rule. The amendments do
not.alter the effects of a jury verdict or the scope of appellate
review.
Subdivision (c)(2), which also deals with the situation
where the trial court has granted the motion for judgment
n.o.v., states that the verdict-winner may apply to the trial
court for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 after the judgment
n.o.v. has been entered against him. In arguing to the trial
court in opposition to the motion for judgment n.o.v., the ver-
dict-winner may, and often will, contend that he is entitled, at
the least, to a new trial, and the court has a range of discretion
to grant a new trial or (where plaintiff won the verdict) to
order a dismissal of the action without prejudice instead of
granting judgment n.o.v. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp &
Paper Co., supra, 330 U.S. at 217, 218. Subdivision (c) (2) is a
reminder that the verdict-winner is entitled, even after entry ofjudgment n.o.v. against him, to move for a new trial in the
usual course. If in these circumstances the motion is granted,
the judgment is superseded.
Even if the verdict-winner makes no motion for a new
trial, he is entitled upon his appeal from the judgment n.o.v.
not only to urge that that judgment should be reversed andjudgment entered upon the verdict, but that errors were com-
mitted during the trial which at the least entitle him to a new
trial (emphasis added).
See Advisory Committee's Note of 1963 to Subdivision (c) in J. MooRE,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE RuLEs PAMAPHLET 871-73 (1966) f[ 50, spec.
supp. 15 (1963).
105. Rule 41 (a) (2) reads as follows:(a) VOLUNTARY DisrVmssAL: EFFEcT TERoF ... (2) BY OR-
DER OF COURT. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counter-
claim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall
not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudica-
tion by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dis-
missal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
106. Alamance Industries, Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142 (Ist Cir.
1961).
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trial judge is free to utilize it on his own accord at any pre-
verdict stage of the trial. While it is true that the order granting
a voluntary nonsuit is reviewable, 0 7 the same is true with a
new trial motion. 08 As with the disposition of a new trial
motion, the judge under Rule 41 has the power to weigh the
equities and do justice in each case.'0 9 Thus, Rule 41 dismissals
could be employed as a protective device which the trial judge
could employ to insure the right of a litigant to a new trial
where justice so requires.
Rule 41 (a) (2), however, will aid the verdict-winner only in
a few circumstances. The Rule would certainly be applicable in
a factual situation similar to Weade"0 where the court believes
that there is a meritorious claim although there may be a
technical failure of proof. The rule grants the trial judge the
power when ruling upon a directed verdict motion under Rule
50, to "permit the claimant to dismiss without prejudice,"'
and this interpretation of the Rule has been approved by the
Supreme Court." 2  Also, a voluntary nonsuit could be used
to prevent the error-free "miscarriages" of justice discussed
earlier." 3 An alert trial judge, sensing that a party has a
sound but poorly presented cause of action could order a dis-
missal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) (2). Similarly, a trial
judge could employ the voluntary nonsuit device to aid a litigant
who has chosen to pursue the wrong theory of liability."
4
Rule 41(a) (2), however, is applicable where the trial has not
107. Larsen v. Nordbye, 181 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1950).
108. See note 93 supra.
109. J. MooRE, MoorE's MAwuAL f 19.03, at 1395 (2d ed. 1953).
110. Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949).
111. See 5 MooRE 41.05, at 1059. It should be noted, however, that
under the current usage of the rule, a dismissal is seldom granted when
the action has progressed beyond the trial stage. Under a literal read-
ing of the rule, however, it is submitted that the trial judge may dismiss
whenever he feels that it is in the interests of justice.
112. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
113. This refers to the "elderly widow" hypothetical which is illus-
trative of the fact that while a trial judge is free to dismiss or grant a
new trial at will, an appellate judge must first find reversible error in
order to do so.
114. Rule 41(a) will also aid in the situation where an appellate
court reverses, as in Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S.
801 (1949), or Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient. Since under the Neely ra-
tionale, the appellate court could then conceivably order a judgment, a
verdict-winner who has adequate evidence but pursued an incorrect
theory of liability is denied the chance to present their issues to the
trial court.
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
yet resulted in a verdict.1 5 For this reason it cannot be utilized
as a device which either a judge or the parties could use in a
post-verdict context to insure the disposition of new trial mo-
tions at the trial court level.
C. REQUIRE BOTH PARTIES TO MAKE ALL THEIR RELATIVE MOTIONS
IN THE TRIAL COURT
Rule 50 (b) provides that a motion for a new trial may be
joined with a judgment n.o.v. motion, or a new trial may be
requested in the alternative." 6 Rules 50 (c) and (d) specify the
necessary steps to be followed, representing a codification of the
procedure delineated by the Supreme Court in Montgomery
Ward & Company v. Duncan.11 7 The trial judge may deny or
grant both motions, grant the judgment n.o.v. and deny the new
trial motion, or grant the new trial and deny the judgment
n.o.v."8 Therefore, if motions in the alternative are presented
to the trial judge, he must rule upon the judgment n.o.v. and
also upon the new trial motion."9
There is no specific prohibition under Rule 50 against re-
quiring both parties to make all available motions at the trial
level. 20 This would at least insure the verdict-winner of in-
voking the discretion of the trial court initially on his new trial
question. But while such a procedure is possibly permissible
under Rule 50, it would be disadvantageous for both the trial
judge and the litigants.
In the first place, the present position of the trial judge is
difficult even without requiring him to rule on both parties'
motions. The trial judge's consideration of the new trial motion
must proceed upon the assumption, as Rule 50(c) (1) states, that
the grant of the judgment will be reversed by the appellate
115. Although a literal reading of 'Rule 41(a) (2) would permit ajudge to grant a post-verdict nonsuit, the rule is only employed in pre-
verdict situations.
116. See 5 MooRE 50.13 at 2375.
117. 311U.S. 243 (1940).
118. See 5 MooRE 50.13 at 2378, and the following cases: Planters
Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Miss. 1965);
Snipes v. Pure Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. La. 1960); White Pine
Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 166 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mich. 1958);
Feeney v. Stieringer, 162 F. Supp. 540 (W.D.N.Y. 1957).
119. It should be noted that where the trial court grants the judg-
ment n.o.v., the grant of a new trial is only conditional upon reversal of
the judgment. See 5 MooRE 50.13 at 2378 and cases cited therein.
120. It is submitted however, that it would require a strained reading
of Rule 50 to permit a verdict-winner to move conditionally for a new
trial in the trial court.
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court.1 2 1 Professor Kaplan hypothesizes a situation where the
ground of the new trial motion was that the verdict was against
the weight of evidence. Consequently, the trial judge in grant-
ing the judgment n.o.v. held that the evidence was insufficient
to go to the jury. Rule 50 (c) (1) places the trial judge in the
difficult position of also having to pass on the new trial issue
before the appellate court informs him where he erred in view-
ing the evidence as insufficient.122 As Judge Wyzanski noted in
Momand v. Universal Film Exchange:
It is doubtful whether the draftsman of the rules and the Jus-
tices who participated in the Montgomery Ward case realized
in what a dilemma their rule might in some cases place a trialjudge and what foresight, abnegation and stultification it might
require of him. But this case serves as an illustration.123
Requiring all parties to make their motions at the trial level,
therefore, would only add to the already complicated task fac-
ing the trial judge. The possible permutations confronting him
with respect to each motion would be overwhelming. 12 4
There is yet another reason why requiring both parties to
make their motions at the trial level before appeal is undesir-
able. Once the verdict-winner obtains a favorable verdict, for-
cing him to argue for a new trial puts him at a strategic dis-
advantage. 12 5 He is concerned only with preserving the victory
he has secured in the trial court. Moreover, if his new trial
motion was granted by the trial court, the verdict-winner is
placed in an unfortunate position under the Rules. A new trial
order, if granted by the trial court, usually supersedes the
appealable judgment.12  Consequently, if the verdict-winner's
121. See note 1 supra.
122. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 1961-1963, 77 HARv. L. REV. 801, 816 (1964). Professor Kaplan
would prefer to grant the trial judge the discretion of refraining from
passing upon the new trial motion until he is informed of the reasons
behind the appellate court reversing his judgment n.o.v.
123. 72 F. Supp. 469, 483 (D. Mass. 1947), aff'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
124. The trial judge must assume for the purposes of the judgment
n.o.v. motion that the appellate court will agree with his finding. With
respect to the new trial motion-a conditional grant-he must assume a
unique position towards each litigant. For the losing party, he must
decide whether to grant a new trial if the court of appeals reverses, for
reasons unknown to him. With respect to the verdict-winner who pre-
vailed on the motion for judgment n.o.v. he must also assume that his
decision will be reversed on appeal; consequently he must treat this
litigant's new trial motion as if he will lose on appeal.
125. See O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 299-95 (5th Cir. 1967)
(dissenting opinion).
126. Id. at 295.
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motion for a new trial is granted, under Rule 50, the verdict-
winner is left with no opportunity to obtain review of his
original judgment. It is true that the trial court could enter
a conditional order of a new trial as well as granting the
judgment n.o.v. under Rules 50(b) and (c), but even under
these circumstances the plaintiff may be reluctant to move for a
new trial because of the uncertainty that the order will be
conditional. 127
Therefore, while requiring all motions to be made at trial
level is perhaps possible under the existing Rules, it is highly
undesirable from the standpoint of both the trial judge and the
verdict-winner. The trial judge would be faced with such a
complex decision that it might well result in pure guesswork.
The verdict-winner is faced with the possibility of losing his
verdict to an unappealable grant of a new trial as well as the
strategic disadvantage of being required to cast doubt upon the
verdict by reciting errors in addition to those the loser raises.128
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Under the present state of the Rules, there is no device that
the verdict-winner can employ to insure himself that he will
have the chance to move for a new trial in the trial court in the
event he loses his jury verdict on appeal. Rule 50(c) (2) is in-
applicable since it applies only to situations where the trial
court has granted a motion for judgment n.o.v. The use of the
voluntary nonsuit under Rule 41(a) (2), while a useful tool at the
trial level, does not aid the verdict-winner in the difficult situa-
tion created by the Neely decision. One possible solution would
be to amend Rule 50 to provide that all conditional motions be
made initially at the trial court level. 29 It is conceded that this
will place the trial judge in an extremely difficult position as
well as necessarily handicapping the verdict-winner in attempt-
ing to preserve his victory. Still, if all verdict-winners are
forced to follow this practice the psychological and strategic
disadvantages will gradually lessen in intensity. Moreover, this
would give the verdict-winner the chance to invoke initially the
127. Id. at 295.
128. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
386 U.S. 317 (1967).
129. While this procedure was perhaps contemplated by the Rule-
framers, it is not clear from a reading of Rule 50. To read the present
rule as permitting a verdict-winner to move conditionally for a new
trial in the event he is reversed on appeal required a rather strained
interpretation.
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discretion of the trial judge on new trial issues.
More desirable, perhaps, would be a procedure under which
the appellate court would remand for disposition of new trial
issues only where such a policy is requested by the trial judge
in the record. This will afford the trial court the opportunity to
decide the new trial question initially in cases where it seems a
possible injustice if the verdict is reversed on appeal. This
procedure, unlike an amendment to Rule 50 providing that all
motions be conditionally made at the trial level, would be ca-
pable of immediate implementation. Moreover, a trial judge, by
indicating his preference on the record, will allow the verdict-
winner to avoid assuming a stance contrary to his verdict.
Finally, such a policy will be consistent with Neely, since the
appellate court could still enter judgment in an "appropriate
case." A notation in the record, however, might well afford the
appellate court with a valuable guide for ascertaining which
cases it should remand for disposition of new trial issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
By its mandate in Neely, 30 the Supreme Court departed
from a long line of precedents which had sought to protect the
rights of the verdict-winner on appeal. The departure was
unfortunate. There are practical and cogent reasons why a
verdict-winner should always be able to invoke the discretion
of the trial judge on the new trial question. First, since the
lower court saw and heard the witnesses, his disposition of the
issue should be a more accurate one. Second, until his judgment
is reversed, the verdict-winner's sole purpose is to protect the
verdict which he obtained in the district court. Forcing him to
urge errors sufficient to justify a new trial in his appellate
brief, or in his petition for rehearing, 31 is inconsistent with
that purpose. The verdict-winner's main contention on appeal
-that the jury verdict was proper-could be vitiated by his
simultaneous emphasis on errors in the trial. 32 Contradictory
pleas and alternative motions in his appellate brief will only
serve to cast doubt on the merit of his primary contention and
confuse the appellate courts. Furthermore, the opposite results
in the Neely and Iacurci cases, on similar facts and procedure,
130. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
131. This procedure was specified in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
132. See O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 294-295 (5th Cir.
1967).
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make it uncertain which cases will be "appropriate" ones for
appellate court action. This lack of procedural clarity is con-
trary to the spirit of the Rules.
The decision in Neely did not remove from the appellate
courts the power to remand to the trial court for determination
of the new trial issue. They should, therefore, consistently
adopt this procedure where necessary so that the verdict-win-
ner's opportunity to move for a :new trial at the trial court
level will be preserved.
